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We develop a model of individual choice in which faculty member is the rational agent and 
maximises a utility function. We find an interior optimum of interactive effort that depends on 
parameters of the utility function, wage, net revenue from a unit of knowledge produced by 
interactive activities, relative weight given to interactive vs. non-interactive activities in the 
determination of prestige and knowledge contribution by unit of time allocated to each activity. The 
model is tested by using a sample of 380 university professors from the Valencian Community, a 
Spanish region. We use censored and discrete choice econometric models to estimate an equation for 
the optimum effort allocated to interactive activities and another one for the real interaction. We 
conclude, first, that interaction activities could be explained by a maximising utility model and that 
individual responds to non-monetary rather than monetary incentives and to the difficulty of 
producing non-interactive rather than interactive knowledge. Second, we detect the possible 
existence of rationing, since optimum effort and real interaction depend on different variables. This 
is possibly an idiosyncrasy of our sample, coming from a region with low absorptive capacity. Policy 
initiatives may see the promotion (or disincentive) of university-industry interaction as a medium-
long term target rather than a short-term one and may be aware of situations arising from 
rationing. 
1. Introduction 
The importance of increasing university-industry 
interaction (UII) in most developed Western economies 
motivates this research. UII takes place in the form of 
contract and collaborative research, industry-oriented 
student’s curricula, practices for students in firms, 
consultancy, joint centres, scientist exchange, informal 
contacts, seminars for firms, patent licensing, etc. The 
reasons behind this growth of UII lie in the enhancement 
of technological innovation attributed to a more tangible 
orientation of academic activities. 
Within innovation studies, several approaches have 
come to justify the interweaving of universities in the 
economy: Freeman (1987) and Lundvall (1988) under the 
perspective of national systems of innovation, Gibbons et 
al. (1994) with their detection of new Mode 2 of 
knowledge production, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1996) 
with their ideas about the Triple Helix model, etc. These 
approaches differ in the importance granted to universities 
in the innovation process, but do not question that some 
degree of interaction with firms should exist. 
Other voices have been more critical. The economics 
of science approach recovers the Mertonian ideas that the 
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mechanism of review by peers can efficiently assign R&D 
resources (Dasgupta and David, 1994). It also emphasises 
that the promotion of UII responds to a narrow vision of 
the benefits of basic research, which leaves aside less 
tangible but equally beneficial links with innovation 
(David et al., 1994). Some of these benefits are increasing 
useful knowledge, training skilled graduates, creating new 
scientific instrumentation and methodology, forming 
networks and social interaction, increasing the capacity 
for scientific and technological problem-solving, creating 
new firms (Salter and Martin, 2001), providing social 
knowledge and access to unique facilities (Scott et al., 
2002). 
The former conflicting views set an ongoing debate on 
whether the marginal value of interactive activities is 
higher than the marginal value of non-interactive activities 
or vice versa. This debate is also present in policymakers 
and university managers’ views. It is convenient to 
understand the rationale underlying the process of 
allocation of effort between different academic activities. 
The ultimate decision regarding this rationale in the 
academic environment corresponds to the individual 
faculty member. At least in public universities, faculty 
members are autonomous to decide whether to engage on 
interactive activities or not. The aim of this paper is to 
analyse the effort they allocate between interactive and 
non-interactive activities. What are the motivations behind 
faculty members’ behaviour? Do monetary incentives 
matter more than non-monetary ones? Is it important that 
production of interactive knowledge may be less time-
consuming than of non-interactive one? 
To reach this goal, this is the structure of the rest of the 
paper: Section 2 presents a theoretical model on how 
faculty members choose the optimal effort. It draws from 
previous models by Beath et al. (2003) and Jensen and 
Thursby (2004). A difference with our model is that we do 
not introduce faculty members’ time devoted to research 
in the utility function but faculty members’ research 
output. Furthermore, we do not assume the distinction 
between basic research leading to prestige and applied 
research as a source of income, but between non-
interactive and interactive activities, both of them leading 
to prestige and the former also as a source of income.1 In 
addition, we carry out an econometric estimation. Section 
3 explains the sample we gathered to test the model. 
Section 4 shows the results. Section 5 concludes and 
provides guidelines for future research. 
2. Theoretical model 
In order to study the professor interactive activities, we 
develop a model of individual choice in which a 
maximising utility agent allocate his scarce time between 
interactive and non-interactive activities. We consider an 
activity interactive when it involves a relationship with 
industrial partners outside the university and non-
interactive in the opposite case. This classification 
overlaps with the usual distinction among academic R&D, 
teaching and management activities since both interactive 
and non-interactive activities may include these tasks. 
We assume that the representative university professor 
−considered rational from an economic point of view− 
maximises the utility function defined by equation (1). 
Professor’s utility level depends on two arguments: 
income (Y) and subjective prestige (M) that comes out of 
academic activities. 
 e-1e Y MU =  (1) 
Being e a parameter with 0 < e < 1 
On one hand, subjective prestige derives from the 
contribution to knowledge from the professor’s activities. 
This contribution comes from two sources: interactive and 
non-interactive activities. We assume that M is obtained 
as a weighted average of each type of contribution. 
 nt K )-(1   K  M δδ +=  (2) 
Where  
Kt – Professor contribution to knowledge from 
interactive activities.  
Kn – Professor contribution to knowledge from non-
interactive activities.  
δ -  Parameter;   0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 
 
On the other hand, the individual income may be 
broken down in wage and revenue from the output of 
interactive activities, both given. Therefore 
 tK  Q   wY +=  (3) 
Where  
w – Professor wage 
Q – Net revenue from a unit of knowledge coming 
from interactive activities.  
 
Knowledge outputs, both interactive and non-
interactive, are determined as linear functions of total time 
allocated in each activity.  
 TA   K t =  (4) 
 N  B K n =  (5) 
Where  
T – Time allocated by the professor to interactive 
activities 
N - Time allocated by the professor to non-interactive 
activities 
A, B – parameters 
 
For the sake of simplicity, we normalise professor total 
time available to interactive and non-interactive activities 
to one. Therefore, the time constraint for professor will 
reduce to 
 N    T  1 +=  (6) 
Substituting equations 2 to 6 into equation 1, utility can 
be expressed as a function of the amount of time devoted 
to interactive activities (T), being T the only decision 
variable, 
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 ( )[ ] ( ) e-1e QATwδATT1δ)B(1U ++−−=  (7) 
By maximising the latter expression with respect to T, 
we obtain the following first order condition that is the 
result of the professor’s optimisation problem: 
 [ ][ ] A -)B -(1 QA  e A -)B -(1  w-e)-(1 B ) -(1A   Q   T δδ δδδ=  (8) 
Therefore, optimum time allocated to interactive 
activities only depends on the parameters of the model. 
Now, considering that T must lie between 0 and 1, we can 
define T* such that individual chooses 
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The condition for an internal solution, i.e. for 0 < T < 
1, is: 
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We can rewrite it this way: 
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One necessary condition for this former to be met is 
that 
 ( ) AB δδ   1 >−  (11) 
In other words, the contribution to prestige of one unit 
of time devoted to non-interactive activities (1−δ)B must 
be higher than the correspondent contribution from one 
unit of time in interactive activities (δA). This is easy to 
understand: since interactive activities provide income, 
the individual would devote the totality of his time to 
these activities if the contribution to prestige of one unit 
of time devoted to these activities were equal or higher.  
Moreover, the difference between these two terms must be 
enough as to compensate the income received. This 
minimum difference depends on the income the individual 
can obtain from a unit of time devoted to interactive 
activities (QA) and the relative preference for income in 
the utility function (1−e). On the other hand, the value of 
this difference has also a maximum. Were the difference 
too high, the individual would concentrate all his time in 
non-interactive activities. 
To ensure that the solution in equation (8) corresponds 
to a maximum, we obtain the second order condition of 
this problem, which corresponds to the following equation 
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Considering that an interior solution holds and 
differentiating (8), we obtain a comparative statics 
exercise: 
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We conclude that the individual will decide to allocate 
more time to interactive activities the higher revenue from 
a unit of knowledge from interactive activities (Q) and the 
amount of interactive knowledge produced by a unit of 
time devoted to such activity (A). On the other hand, the 
individual will be more reluctant to allocate time in 
interactive activities the higher his wage (w), the amount 
of non-interactive knowledge produced by a unit of time 
devoted to such activity (B), the weight given to non-
interactive activities in the determination of prestige (δ) 
and the relative preference for prestige versus income (e). 
3. Econometric model 
The purpose of this section is to estimate a series of 
econometric models that will allow us to test the 
theoretical model put forward in the previous section. We 
will use as explained variables some proxies for time 
allocated to interactive activities. 
In order to estimate the models, we have data on 
faculty members from the Valencian Community, 
gathered through a survey carried out in 2001. The 
Valencian Community is a Spanish region, with a per 
capita GDP about the national average. Its manufacturing 
structure relies on traditional, low-tech sectors such as 
toys, textile, shoes, furniture, ceramic tiles, etc. This 
pattern of specialisation is one of the reasons why the 
region has several technological weaknesses as for 
example a low level of expenditure on R&D (0.81% of 
GDP in 2002, 79% of the Spanish average and 42% of 
EU-15 average) mainly on the part of firms (that financed 
32% of total R&D in 2001, 65% of the Spanish average 
and 54% of EU-15 average), a shortage of financial 
organisations of innovation, and little articulation of 
institutional links (Fernandez et al., 2001). Therefore, it 
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fits in the description of a region with low absorptive 
capacity, and we will have to take it into account in the 
interpretation of the results2. 
The population of the survey includes faculty members 
from the five public universities of the Valencian 
Community. We stratified it in three teaching scales: full 
professors, assistant professors and associate professors3. 
Selection was by means of simple random sampling. The 
sample was 10% of the population, or 872 individuals4. 
We obtained a response rate of 44%, so we could build a 
database with 382 observations. 
Unfortunately, the questionnaire was not designed to 
match our theoretical model. Therefore, we do not have 
direct measures to test it empirically. However, we are 
able to build some proxies departing from the existing 
information.  
To start with, the questionnaire included questions 
regarding the support for different objectives of UII, 
which we will use as a proxy for the optimum effort 
allocated to interactive activities. The basic assumption is 
that the higher support for the objectives of UII, the higher 
propensity to allocate time to interactive activities. Hence, 
we define: 
 
? Support: average importance given to six objectives of 
UII 
? To favour oriented research in the university 
? To participate in the economic development of the 
region 
? To intensify the commercialisation of the results of 
academic research 
? To favour the creation of firms based on academic 
research 
? To obtain additional funds for R&D activities 
? To adapt teaching programmes5 
 
Each objective was ranked as follows: 0 (“no or weak 
support”), 1 (“some support”) and 2 (“strong support”). 
We assume that they have the same weight in the 
determination of their average. Support is therefore a 
quasi-continuous variable ranging between 0 and 2. Since 
we want the predictions of the model to fall between this 
range, we consider that support follows a distribution that 
is left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 2. The tobit 
model appears to be the adequate method of estimation 
given this consideration. 
The optimum effort allocated to interactive activities 
may not coincide with the degree of real interaction, i.e. if 
exogenous constraints or rationing on individual 
behaviour arises. It would result in a degree of real 
interaction below the individual optimum. Consequently, 
we define another variable as a proxy for the real effort 
allocated to interactive activities: 
 
? Cooperation: perceived degree of R&D cooperation 
with firms. We considered three answers, ranked as 
follows: 0 (“none”), 1 (“some”) and 2 (“much” or 
“very much”). 
 
Given the qualitative and indexed nature of the 
response variables for cooperation we decided to use an 
ordered probit for estimating our econometric model. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variables. If we assume that support and cooperation are 
measured in the same, comparable, scale, we may notice 
that the mean is lower for the second. This may indicate 
that the optimum level of time allocated to interactive 
activities is actually higher than the real level.6 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Number of cases 
Support 1.19 0.52 0 2 360 
Cooperation 0.75 0.77 0 2 373 
 
Here is the list and description of the explanatory 
variables: 
 
? w: proxy for faculty member wage. It is the average of 
the following variables, ranging from 0 to 3: 
? Faculty member age: 0 (less than 30 years), 1 
(between 30 and 39 years), 2 (between 40 and 49 
years), 3 (more than 49 years). 
? Teaching experience: 0 (less than 5 years), 1 
(between 5 and 9 years), 2 (between 10 and 14 
years), 3 (more than 14 years). 
? Teaching scale: 01 (associate professor), 1 (assistant 
professor), 2 (full professor 1), 3 (full professor 2).7 
? Number of Spanish six-year term research awards 
(so-called sexenia): 0 (none), 1 (one), 2 (two), 3 
(more than two).  
? Holding a managerial position at the university: 0 
(no), 3 (yes). 
? Q: proxy for net revenue from a unit of knowledge 
produced by interactive activities. It is the average of 
the following variables, regarding the perceived 
influence of UII on some aspects of academic life. All 
take values 1 (positive) and 0 (otherwise): 
? Perceived influence of UII on faculty members 
salary 
? Perceived influence of UII on public resources for 
R&D projects 
? Perceived influence of UII on scientific career 
(sexenia) 
? δ: proxy for the relative weight given to interactive vs. 
non-interactive activities in the determination of 
prestige. It is the average of the following variables, 
with the same interpretation and range of those 
included in w: 
? Perceived influence of UII on professional openings 
for students and collaborators 
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? Perceived influence of UII on exchange of relevant 
knowledge 
? Perceived influence of UII on freedom of selection 
of research agenda 
? A: proxy for knowledge contribution by unit of time 
allocated to interactive activities. It is the average of 
the following variables, ranging from 0 to 1: 
? Technological content of faculty members’ 
university: 0 (four non-polytechnic universities), 1 
(one polytechnic university). 
? Technological content of faculty member’s 
discipline: 0 (social sciences and humanities), 0.5 
(exact and natural sciences), 1 (engineering and 
technology). 
? Being an associate professor: 0 (no), 1 (yes). The 
rationale under this variable is that associate 
professors in Spain are supposed to have previous 
experience in non-academic domains, e.g. industry. 
We expect that this will diminish cognitive barriers 
to interact with industry and then be positively 
related to knowledge contribution by unit of time 
allocated to interactive activities. 
? Length of research abroad: 0 (0 months), 0.25 
(between 0 and 5 months), 0.5 (between 6 and 24 
months), 1 (more than 24 months). Here the 
assumption is that faculty members who do 
research abroad do so to improve their scientific 
knowledge. Hence, they will tend to travel to 
leading scientific countries with more to offer, 
especially if they are from regions with low 
absorptive capacity. Some of these leading 
countries also interact more with industry (e.g. the 
USA). Therefore, faculty members who do research 
abroad may learn how to increase knowledge 
contribution by unit of time allocated to interactive 
activities. 
? Perceived influence of the institutional policy of the 
respondent’s university on cooperation with firms: 
1 (“it favours cooperation”), 0 (otherwise). 
? B: proxy for knowledge contribution by unit of time 
allocated to non-interactive activities. It is the average 
of the following variables, ranging from 0 to 3 
? Faculty member’s university age: 0 (the two 
youngest universities, less than ten years old), 1 (a 
twenty years old university), 2 (a thirty-five years 
old university), 3 (a five hundred years old 
university). 
? Teaching experience: same as defined for w. 
? e: personal preferences in the utility function. We 
assume that they may vary according to sex: 0 (male), 
1 (female). 
 
Table 2 offers descriptive statistics of the independent 
variables. Faculty members wage (w) and preferences (e), 
represented by sex, are the most biased to the left, i.e. 
most faculty members earn lower wages and are male –
actually, 72%. Relative weight given to interactive vs. 
non-interactive activities in the determination of prestige 
(δ) is the most skewed to the right variable, i.e. most 
faculty members think that UII has a positive effect on 
non-monetary incentives. δ is also the most leptokurtic, 
reinforcing this impression. Notice that the average is 
comparable to net revenue from a unit of knowledge 
produced by interactive activities (Q), and it is a bit higher 
for δ, which means that faculty members consider that UII 
has a more positive effect on non-monetary than on 
monetary incentives. In addition, knowledge contribution 
by unit of time allocated to non-interactive activities (B) is 
the second variable most skewed to the right, i.e. most 
faculty members are in the oldest universities and they 
have many years of teaching experience. On turn, 
knowledge contribution by unit of time allocated to 
interactive activities (A) is the second variable with the 
highest kurtosis, which means that most faculty members 
qualify for producing interactive knowledge. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Number of 
cases 
w 1.23 0.80 0.33 1.98 0 3 357 
Q 0.51 0.31 -0.05 2.10 0 1 380 
δ 0.63 0.29 -0.55 2.78 0 1 380 
A 0.39 0.20 0.13 2.28 0 0.8 367 
B 1.70 0.90 -0.19 1.89 0 3 378 
e 0.28 0.45 1.00 2.00 0 1 380 
 
4. Results 
We weighted the models using teaching scale, that is the 
stratification variable as we have shown in the previous 
section. We present the reduced models that only consider 
significant variables 8.  
Column 1 in Table 3 includes the estimation of our 
proxy variable for the optimum time allocated to 
interactive activities, the average support for the 
objectives of UII. The significance of the σ parameter 
indicates that there is actually censoring, thus the 
technique of estimation appears to be adequate. We find 
that the intensity of the support for the objectives of UII 
depends negatively on knowledge contribution by unit of 
time allocated to non-interactive activities. This intensity 
does not depend on wage9, income from interactive 
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activities, knowledge contribution by unit of time 
allocated to interactive activities and parameters of the 
utility function. Moreover, it depends positively on weight 
of interactive activities in the determination of prestige. 
Therefore, significant variables are the most negatively 
skewed and their sign is the one predicted by the 
theoretical model.10 
Column 2 in Table 3 shows the estimation of our proxy 
variable for real time allocated to interactive activities, the 
degree of R&D co-operation with firms. The significance 
of the µ parameter indicates that the dependent variable is 
actually ordered, thus the technique of estimation is 
adequate. The frequency of R&D co-operation depends 
positively on wage, knowledge contribution by unit of 
time allocated to interactive activities and weight given to 
interactive activities in the determination of prestige. This 
frequency does not depend on knowledge contribution by 
unit of time allocated to non-interactive activities. 
Frequency of co-operation depends negatively on income 
from interactive activities and parameters of the utility 
function. Note that the sign for wage and income from 
interactive activities is different from the predicted by the 
theoretical model. 
Table 3. Estimation of optimum and real time allocated to interactive activities 
 1 
Tobit Model - censored (0,2) 
2 
Ordered Probability Model 
Dependent variable Support Cooperation 
Number of observations 358 340 
Log likelihood function -308.01 -313.71 
Prob[χ2> value] =   0.00 
   
 Coeff. Coeff. 
Constant 0.93 (9.66) -1.07 (-4.53) 
w  0.35 (4.3) 
Q  -0.56 (-2.44) 
δ 0.7 (6.55) 0.53 (2.07) 
A  2.14 (6.15) 
B -0.09 (-2.76)  
e  -0.59 (-3.85) 
σ 0.54 (24.11)  
µ  1.11 (12.39) 
 
5. Conclusions 
We conclude, first, that a maximising utility model could 
explain interaction activities and that individual responds 
to incentives when deciding to allocate efforts among 
activities.  
If it is desirable to promote UII through policy 
measures, then it is important to discern which are subject 
to public control and, among them, which have significant 
effects and what their intensity is. It is remarkable that, 
according to our results, the relative weight given to 
interactive vs. non-interactive activities in the 
determination of prestige, measured through non-
monetary incentives, is significant, whereas wage and 
revenue from a unit of knowledge produced by interactive 
activities, i.e. monetary incentives, are not. This has one 
major implication: policies towards non-monetary 
incentives are more difficult to implement and therefore 
promoting UII must be seen as a medium-long term target 
rather than a short-term one. 
Although less subject to public control, it is relevant to 
notice that the effect of knowledge contribution by unit of 
time allocated to non-interactive activities is significant, 
whereas it is not the case for interactive activities. This 
implies that UII is a question of how difficult is to 
produce non-interactive knowledge rather than how 
difficult is UII per se. 
Our second conclusion is related to the possible 
existence of rationing, i.e. individual is unable to interact 
as much as desired since the real amount of interaction 
may be decided by industry. In this sense, we detect that 
the intensity of the support for the objectives of 
interaction and the degree of actual R&D cooperation 
differ. However, there may be a (non-exclusive) 
explanation, from the econometric perspective, i.e. a 
misspecification problem given that industry’s decision 
may affect the results. To disentangle this issue will be 
subject to further research. It would be interesting because 
if UII is considered as desirable, policy initiatives might 
help to eliminate sub-optimal situations arising from 
rationing. 
These conclusions should only apply to regions like the 
one we have analysed, i.e. with low absorptive capacity. 
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This can be seen either as a limitation or as an opportunity 
to study UII from a less common perspective, not focused 
as usually on high-tech regions. 
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Appendix 
Table 4 reports marginal effects of the estimations in 
Table 3 –so-called full effects. For support, the scale 
factor is 0.91, so marginal effects do not make much 
difference with full effects. On the contrary, for 
cooperation they permit the interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients as elasticities and clarify the direction of 
change. This is what we analyse next. 
Table 4. Marginal effects of the estimation of optimum and real time allocated to interactive activities 
 1 
Tobit Model - censored (0,2) 
2 
Ordered Probability Model 
Dependent variable Support  Cooperation 
 Coeff. Cooperation=0 Cooperation=1 Cooperation=2 
Constant 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 
w  -0.14 0.06 0.08 
Q  0.22 -0.09 -0.13 
δ 0.64 -0.21 0.09 0.13 
A  -0.85 0.34 0.51 
B -0.08    
e  0.23 -0.11 -0.12 
 
According to Column 2, marginal effects show that an 
increase of wage (w) rises the probability of “some 
cooperation” by 6% and of “much/very much 
cooperation” by 8%. An increase of relative prestige from 
R&D Management Conference 2005, 6-8 July, Pisa 
interaction (δ) rises the probability of “some cooperation” 
by 9% and of “much/very much cooperation” by 13%. An 
increase of efficiency in the production of interactive 
knowledge (A) rises the probability of “some 
cooperation” by 34% and of “much/very much 
cooperation” by 51%. An increase of revenue from 
interaction (Q) reduces the probability of “some 
cooperation” by 9% and of “much/very much 
cooperation” by 13%. An increase of the preference for 
income instead of prestige (e), which in our model is 
equivalent to be female, reduces the probability of “some 
cooperation” by 9% and of “much/very much 
cooperation” by 14%. 
                                                 
1 Finally, we do not consider a principal-agent model as Jensen 
and Thusby but an individual choice model as Beath et al., 
since it fits better in the European context, where universities 
and professors do not have so much bargaining power. In 
fact, wage levels at public universities are set by law. 
2 We follow Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) definition of 
absorptive capacity: “a limit to the rate or quantity of 
scientific or technological information that firm can absorb”. 
To justify the extension of the concept of absorptive capacity 
from firms to regions, see Niosi and Bellon (2002). 
3 The equivalence between the Spanish original categories and 
the three categories that we mention is not exact, but it uses 
more popular terms, it simplifies the exposition at the same 
time that captures the intuition behind the original categories. 
4 The questionnaire was sent by the research vice-rectorates of 
each university by electronic mail to the random sample of 
faculty members. Once filled in, faculty members could 
return the questionnaire by electronic mail, ordinary mail or 
fax. After a first stage of spontaneous response, a follow-up 
team was organised to make telephone contact with faculty 
members of the sample. This fieldwork took place between 
22nd May 2001 and 30th June 2001. 
5 For a separate treatment of each objective, see Azagra et al. 
(2005). 
6 Another question in the survey provides further evidence: 83% 
of faculty members would like to increase R&D cooperation 
with firms. 
7 Some full professors in Spain have time only for teaching 
activities as a statement in their contract. This is what we call 
“full professors 1”. The rest have also time for research 
activities. This is what we call “full professors 2”. 
8 Marginal effects are shown in the appendix. 
9 We also tried to build an alternative variable for wage, we, 
according to this formula (Pons and Blanco, 2005): we = exp 
[6.4738 + 0.0248*(faculty age) - 0.0003*(faculty age2) + 
0.0048*(years of teaching experience) + 0.1504*(teaching 
scale)]. It did not change the results. 
10 We also made estimations using ordinary least squares and 
ordered probit models –in this latter case, taking the integer 
part of the original variable to transform it into an ordinal 
one. It did not change the results. 
